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I. INTRODUCTION

Spoliation of evidence has plagued the court system for centuries and threatens to
undermine the right to a fair trial, which is an essential concept of American justice.
Generally, spoliation refers to the “destruction or material alteration of evidence or
the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or
reasonably foreseeable litigation.”1 Courts universally recognize that spoliation “can
destroy fairness and justice” by increasing the likelihood of erroneous decisions.2
Spoliation can also increase the costs of litigation by forcing parties to reconstruct
destroyed evidence or to produce other evidence, which may not be as accessible or
persuasive.3
For those reasons, courts have been attempting to find ways to combat spoliation
ever since the English case of Armory v. Delamirie4 was decided in 1722.5 In that
case, the adverse inference was introduced for the first time as a method to diminish
the prejudicial effects that spoliation has on judicial decisions.6 The adverse
inference allows the Judge to instruct the jury that altered or destroyed evidence is of
the utmost importance and would have been unfavorable to the spoliating party’s
case. 7 Since then, however, courts have developed a number of methods, other than
the adverse inference, to combat spoliation.8 Most recently, some states’ courts have
begun to develop independent tort claims for spoliation.9

1
West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (6th ed. 1990)); see also Willard v. Caterpillar, Inc., 48 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 607 (Ct. App. 1995) (“Spoliation [of evidence] is the destruction or significant
alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve evidence for another’s use in pending or
future litigation.”); Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. Milam & Co. Constr., Inc., 901 So. 2d 84 (Ala.
2004) (“Spoliation [of evidence] is an attempt by a party to suppress or destroy material
evidence favorable to the party’s adversary . . . [and] is sufficient foundation for an inference
of the spoliator’s guilt or negligence.”).
2

See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511, 515 (Cal. 1998).

3

See id.

4

Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722).

5

See Sean R. Levine, Spoliation of Evidence in West Virginia: Do Too Many Torts
Spoliate the Broth?, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 419, 424 (2002).
6

See id.

7

See id.

8

See id.

9

See id.
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Traditionally, courts have relied on various sanctions to combat the negative
effects of spoliation,10 but a number of states’ courts have recently begun to explore
separate tort claims to attempt to further combat and deter spoliation.11 Under the
torts, the jury is left to confer the damages that would have been awarded in the
underlying claim, had the evidence not been destroyed or altered.12
Proponents of the various spoliation torts claim that they help to further deter the
destruction of evidence as well as provide compensation to the victim where it
otherwise may not have been available.13 Recognizing independent torts for
spoliation, however, comes with significant problems. Perhaps the biggest of which,
is the fact that there is frequently no way of knowing what the altered or destroyed
evidence would have shown.14 Thus, the jury is left to speculate about the fact of
harm and amount of damages.15 A second major criticism is that the torts, by their
very nature, are derivative.16 Derivative torts are those that arise based on litigation
related misconduct that occurred in an underlying lawsuit.17 Derivative torts violate
the general policy against disturbing the finality of adjudication, and, as a result,
invite spurious claims that prolong litigation.18 Lastly, many argue that independent
torts for spoliation are unnecessary, as the majority of states have found that
traditional methods of addressing spoliation are adequate to both deter and remedy
the destruction of evidence.19 Ohio should join the majority of states in refusing to
recognize independent torts for spoliation because the torts are inherently
speculative, they invite spurious claims that prolong litigation, and because
traditional methods of addressing spoliation adequately deter and provide a remedy.
The Note that follows will explore the different variations of independent torts
for spoliation as well as various policy arguments used by supporters and critics of
the torts. Specifically, Section II of this Note will explore the history behind the
recognition of independent torts for spoliation. Section III will explain the traditional
remedies courts have used to combat spoliation of evidence, and Section IV will
10

See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 37. See also Shannon D. Hutchings, Tortious Liability for
Spoliation of Evidence, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 381, 400 (2000) (“Most States have a civil
procedure rule modeled after Federal Rule 37.”).
11

Hutchings, supra note 10, at 383.

12

Id.

13

See Smith v. Super. Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding “[f]or every
wrong there is a remedy” and not allowing the tort “encourage[s] violence and invite[s]
depredation”); see also Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 566 (W. Va. 2003) (Recognizing
that “[f]or every wrong there is supposed to be a remedy somewhere” and that “additional
foundations of tort law are morality and deterrence.”).
14

Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511, 518 (Cal. 1998)

15

Id.

16

See id. at 515 (recognizing longstanding policy against derivative tort remedies for
litigation related misconduct).
17

See id.

18

See id. (finding derivative tort remedies encourage “a spiral of lawsuits”).

19

Rachel L. Sykes, A Phantom Menace: Spoliation of Evidence in Idaho Civil Cases, 42
IDAHO L. REV. 821, 848 (2006).
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detail the various forms of the spoliation tort. Section V of this paper will examine
various policy arguments employed by supporters and detractors of the torts. Section
VI will examine Ohio’s treatment of the various forms of the spoliation torts. Lastly,
Section VII will analyze the merits of the various policy arguments as they apply to
the different types of the spoliation tort. In addition, it will seek to show why Ohio
should not recognize spoliation torts in any of their manifestations.
II. HISTORY OF INDEPENDENT TORTS FOR SPOLIATION
The recognition of independent torts for spoliation is a relatively new trend. In
1984, in Smith v. Superior Court, California became the first state to recognize a
separate cause of action for spoliation.20 In Smith, the plaintiff was driving her
automobile when the left tire of an oncoming car flew off the vehicle and into the
plaintiff’s windshield.21 The plaintiff was left permanently blind from the accident
and filed suit against the dealer that customized the vehicle’s wheels before selling
it.22 Following the accident, the vehicle was towed by the dealer and taken in for
repairs.23 The dealer, however, was directed by the plaintiff’s attorney to maintain
certain physical evidence for further investigation.24 Despite agreeing with the
plaintiff’s attorney to preserve the evidence, the evidence was subsequently
“destroyed, lost or transferred . . . making it impossible for the [plaintiff’s] experts to
inspect and test those parts to pinpoint the cause of the failure of the wheel assembly
on the van.”25 Since the destruction of the evidence made it impossible for the
plaintiff to recover any damages in the underlying suit, the court allowed the plaintiff
to bring a separate tort claim against the defendant for intentional spoliation. 26 In
doing so, the court reasoned that no innocent victim should go uncompensated
stating that: “[f]or every wrong there is a remedy.”27 The court also cited a recent
trend toward recognizing new torts, including, inter alia, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and infliction of prenatal injuries as the
impetus for allowing the new spoliation tort.28
A few months later, in Bondu v. Gurvich, the Florida Third District Court of
Appeals became one of the first courts to recognize an independent tort for the
negligent destruction of evidence.29 In Bondu, the plaintiff was the spouse of a man

20

Smith v. Super. Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832 (Ct. App. 1984).

21

Id. at 831.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

See generally id.

27

Id.

28

Id. at 832 (“When it becomes clear that the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal
protection against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is novel will not
itself operate as a bar to a remedy.”).
29

Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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who died during heart surgery.30 After her husband’s death, she subsequently filed
suit against the hospital and the anesthesiologists for negligence.31 During discovery,
the plaintiff requested certain medical records that the hospital had apparently lost.32
The plaintiff subsequently claimed that the loss of the medical records frustrated her
ability to pursue her case.33 The Bondu Court allowed the plaintiff to proceed with
her cause of action for negligent spoliation, finding that the hospital had a duty to
“maintain medical records . . . imposed by administrative regulations.”34 In doing so,
the court also reasoned that tort law is “anything but static” and that “new and
nameless torts” are constantly being recognized to provide adequate compensation to
those who have been wronged.35
Since the Smith and Bondu decisions, a number of variations of the spoliation
tort have been developed, including first party intentional spoliation,36 third party
intentional spoliation,37 first party negligent spoliation,38 and third party negligent
spoliation.39 Several jurisdictions, including West Virginia, Alaska, Montana, the
District of Columbia, Illinois, New Mexico, and Ohio recognize the spoliation torts
in one or more of their manifestations.40 A majority of states, however, have refused
30

Id. at 1309.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 1312.

35

Id. (quoting PROSSER, supra note 35, at § 1, pp. 3-4 (4th ed. 1971)) (“New and nameless
torts are being recognized constantly, and the progress of the common law is marked by many
cases of first impression, in which the court has struck out boldly to create a new cause of
action, where none has been recognized before. . . . The law of torts is anything but static, and
the limits of its development are never set. When it becomes clear that the plaintiff’s interests
are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the
claim is novel will not itself operate as a bar to the remedy.”).
36

Nichols v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 6 P.3d 300 (Alaska 2000); Smith v. Howard
Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993); Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560 (W. Va.
2003).
37
Nichols, 6 P.3d 300; Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11 (Mont. 1999);
Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995); Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d
at 1038; Hannah, 584 S.E.2d 560.
38

Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846 (D.C. 1998); Bondu, 473 So. 2d 1307.

39

Holmes, 710 A.2d at 846; Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. 1995);
Oliver, 993 P.2d at 18; Hannah, 584 S.E.2d 560.
40
Hannah, 584 S.E.2d 560 (recognizing independent tort for intentional spoliation and for
some third party negligent spoliation, but rejecting first party negligent spoliation as
independent tort); Nichols, 6 P.3d 300 (recognizing independent tort for first party and third
party intentional spoliation but rejecting independent tort for first-party negligent spoliation);
Oliver, 993 P.2d 11 (recognizing independent tort for negligent or intentional third party
spoliation, but not for first party spoliation); Holmes, 710 A.2d 846 (recognizing independent
tort for negligent third-party spoliation); Boyd, 652 N.E.2d 267 (recognizing independent tort
of negligent spoliation against principal defendant’s liability insurer); Coleman, 905 P.2d 185
(recognizing tort for intentional third party spoliation, but not for negligent spoliation);
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to recognize separate causes of action for spoliation, regardless of what form the
torts take.41 As these states have begun to note many of the problems associated with
independent torts for spoliation, other states have begun to rethink their position on
the torts.
For example, in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, just fourteen years after Smith, the
Supreme Court of California overruled the Second District Court of Appeal’s
decision to recognize separate causes of action for intentional spoliation.42 In
Cedars-Sinai, the plaintiff was injured during birth and alleged that the defendant
hospital intentionally destroyed evidence relevant to his malpractice action.43 The
court recognized that “[t]he intentional destruction of evidence is a grave affront to
the cause of justice and deserves our unqualified condemnation.”44 However, even
though the court noted that spoliation destroys judicial integrity, it held that such
destruction was not enough to justify recognizing a separate cause of action for
spoliation.45 The court refrained from recognizing the spoliation torts because it
found that they were inherently speculative, violated the policy against derivative
tort remedies, and decided that traditional remedies were adequate to deter
spoliation.46
California was not the only state to reverse its stance on recognizing separate
causes of action for spoliation.47 In 2005, in Martino v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the
Supreme Court of Florida followed suit and overruled the Third District Court of
Appeal’s decision in Bondu, which recognized negligent spoliation as a separate
tort.48 In Martino, the plaintiff’s arm was injured by a collapsible shopping cart
Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (recognizing independent tort for intentional first
party and third party spoliation).
41

Gardner v. Blackston, 365 S.E.2d 545 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting claim for firstparty spoliation); Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 824 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 2005) (rejecting
claim for first-party spoliation); Meyn v. State, 594 N.W.2d 31 (Iowa 1999) (rejecting tort for
third-party negligent spoliation and stating in dicta first-party claim also not cognizable);
Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124 (Miss. 2002) (rejecting independent tort
for intentional first-party or third-party spoliation); Oliver, 993 P.2d 11 (rejecting cause of
action for first-party spoliation); Timber Tech Engineered Bldg. Prods. v. The Home Ins. Co.,
55 P.3d 952 (Nev. 2002) (rejecting cause of action for first-party spoliation); Rosenblit v.
Zimmerman, 766 A.2d 749 (N.J. 2001) (rejecting independent tort for spoliation but
permitting similar remedy under theory of fraudulent concealment); Ortega v. City of New
York, 876 N.E.2d 1189 (N.Y. 2007) (rejecting independent tort for spoliation but recognizing
action for negligently or intentionally impairing right to bring action against tortfeasor).
42

See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998).

43

Id. at 512.

44

Id.

45

Id. at 515 (“That alone . . . is not enough to justify creating tort liability for such
conduct.”).
46
See id. at 517 (“Weighing against our recognition of a tort cause of action for spoliation
in this case are both the strong policy favoring use of nontort remedies rather than derivative
tort causes of action to punish and correct litigation misconduct and the prohibition against
attacking adjudications on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed.”).
47

Martino v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 908 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2005).

48

Id.
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while shopping at Wal-Mart.49 The plaintiff filed suit alleging Wal-Mart was
negligent in maintaining its shopping carts.50 During discovery, the plaintiff
requested the shopping cart and a copy of the video surveillance tape, but Wal-Mart
was unable to produce the items.51 In declining to recognize a separate cause of
action for negligent spoliation, the court held that traditional sanctions were
sufficient to combat the destruction of evidence.52
As can be seen from the cases above, two of the first states to recognize separate
spoliation torts, California and Florida, began to notice many of the same difficulties
that accompany recognizing other derivative torts.53 But on top of that, spoliation
torts present an additional problem, mainly that there is often no way to tell what the
evidence would have shown had it not been destroyed or altered.54 The inability to
show exactly what the evidence would have proved, often times, makes it very
difficult to show that its destruction was the proximate cause of the loss in the
underlying case.55 Yet, despite all of the problems associated with independent torts
for spoliation, there are still a few states, including Ohio, that have not retreated from
their recognition of one or more of the spoliation torts.56
III. TRADITIONAL METHODS OF COMBATTING SPOLIATION
Traditionally, courts have used various sanctions and criminal statutes to combat
the ongoing problem of spoliation. Courts generally have broad discretion in
imposing sanctions for spoliation, which allows them to fashion appropriate
remedies under specific circumstances.57 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on
which most state rules of civil procedure are based, also provide a wide variety of
sanctions that could be imposed.58 In addition to sanctions, several states have
passed statutes that make it a criminal act to destroy relevant evidence relating to

49

Id. at 344.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id. at 346 (“[W]hen evidence [is] intentionally lost, misplaced, or destroyed by one
party, trial courts [are] to rely on sanctions found in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.380(b)(2) . . . .”).
53
See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998); see also Martino,
908 So. 2d 342.
54

See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d 511.

55

See id.

56

See supra note 40.

57

See Brian F. Stayton & Jesse L. Ray, Spoliation of Evidence: An Overview and
Practical Suggestions, 24 CONSTR. LAW. 31, 32 (2004) (“Courts have exercised wide
discretion in fashioning discovery sanctions for spoliation to fit the particular case.”).
58
Hutchings, supra note 10, at 400 (quoting Marrocco v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d
220, 225 (7th Cir. 1992)) (“Quite simply, sanctions can be employed for a wide array of
purposes . . . .”).
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pending or probable litigation.59 The following section will explore the sanctions and
criminal statutes courts have traditionally used to combat spoliation.
A. Sanctions
Courts may impose a wide variety of sanctions for spoliation.60 The typical
vehicle courts use to impose these sanctions is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37.61
A majority of states, including Ohio, also have a procedural rule modeled after
Federal Rule 37.62 Federal Rule 37 is the primary rule by which courts sanction
parties for failing to cooperate during the discovery process.63 Rule 37, however,
only governs violations of a court order or discovery request and does not apply to
spoliation that occurs prior to litigation.64 But, courts do have the inherent power to
impose a wide variety of sanctions for pre-litigation spoliation and are generally
given broad discretion to do so:65 Sanctions will only be reversed for clear abuse of
discretion.66 Typical sanctions include, but are not limited to, the granting of an
adverse inference, default judgment and dismissal of the case, exclusion of evidence
or testimony, and monetary sanctions.67 Each of these sanctions will be described
and discussed below.
1. Adverse Inference
Perhaps the most effective and valuable evidentiary sanction designed to combat
spoliation is the adverse evidentiary inference. Where evidence critical to the
plaintiff’s case has been destroyed or concealed by a defendant, courts will often
permit an adverse inference to be drawn against the spoliating party.68 The party
whose evidence has been destroyed or altered is allowed to introduce evidence of the
allegedly destroyed materials.69 The alleged victim bears the burden of proving that
the materials were altered or destroyed.70 If the judge finds that the opposing party
59

See ALA. CODE § 13A-10-129 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.610 (1996); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 215.40 (McKinney 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-221.1 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2921.12 (West 2013); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5105 (West 2014); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 37.09 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-510 (repealed 2001); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-460 (2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.60 (West 2013).
60
Hutchings, supra note 10, at 400; see also Stayton & Ray, supra note 57, at 32 (“Courts
have exercised a wide discretion in fashioning discovery sanctions for spoliation to fit the
particular case.”).
61

See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 37. Hutchings, supra note 10, at 400.

62

Hutchings, supra note 10, at 400. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 37.

63

See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 37

64

Hutchings, supra note 10, at 401.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

See FED. R. CIV. P. 37; see also OHIO R. CIV. P. 37.

68

See Hutchings, supra note 10, at 405.

69

See Levine, supra note 5, at 429.

70

Id.
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altered or destroyed evidence, he may instruct the jury to infer that the altered or
destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the spoliating party.71
There are three main rationales for allowing the adverse inference to be used
against a spoliating party. First, it deters intentional spoliation by placing the risk of
an adverse inference on the spoliator.72 Second, if a party intentionally destroys
evidence, that evidence was likely detrimental to the party’s case.73 Lastly, the
adverse inference protects the non-spoliating party by remedying the wrong
committed by the spoliator.74
Jurisdictions are split in their determinations of when granting an adverse
inference is appropriate, but most agree that an adverse inference should not be
granted where the spoliator is able to show that the altered or destroyed evidence is
of little value.75 Jurisdictions also consider the level of culpability of the spoliator.76
Courts will generally find the granting of an adverse inference appropriate only if the
following elements are satisfied: “(1) an act of destruction; (2) discoverability of the
evidence; (3) an intent to destroy the evidence; (4) occurrence of the act at a time
after suit has been filed, or, if before filing, at a time when the finding is fairly
perceived as imminent.”77 Although Ohio has held that the adverse inference may be
used in cases of gross negligence,78 most states will only give an adverse inference
for evidence that has been destroyed intentionally.79 Thus, the adverse inference
generally does not serve as a remedy for parties whose evidence was negligently
destroyed or altered.80 The adverse inference is also not a remedy for those parties
whose evidence was spoliated by a person who is not a party to the suit and who has
no stake in the litigation.81
2. Default Judgment and Dismissal
Another option courts have when deciding cases in which evidence has been
destroyed or tampered with is to dismiss the entire cause of action or to enter a
71
See Stayton & Ray, supra note 57, at 31 (An example of a typical spoliation inference
jury instruction: “[w]hen evidence is within the control of a party whose natural interest it
would be to produce that evidence, and that party destroys the evidence without adequate
cause, it may be inferred that such evidence would be unfavorable to that party.”).
72

See Laurie Kindel & Kai Richter, Spoliation of Evidence: Will the New Millennium See
a Further Expansion of Sanctions for the Improper Destruction of Evidence?, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 687, 695 (2000).
73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Levine, supra note 5, at 428-29.

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

See Roetenberger v. Christ Hosp., 839 N.E.2d 441, 448 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (leaving
open possibility of adverse inference being used in cases of gross negligence).
79

Levine, supra note 5, at 428-29.

80

See id. at 429.

81

See id.
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default judgment for the non-spoliating party.82 Since dismissal is an extremely
severe penalty, however, it is reserved for the most egregious acts of spoliation.83
Dismissal may not be imposed if there is a “lesser, but equally efficient remedy
available.”84 Typically, this sanction is imposed on parties that have destroyed
evidence intentionally and willfully for the purpose of weakening the opposing
party’s case.85 Thus, “parties that intentionally spoliate evidence do so at
considerable peril to their case.”86 Like the adverse inference, however, default
judgment and dismissal generally do not apply to parties who spoliate evidence
negligently or to third party spoliators with no stake in the litigation.87
3. Exclusion of Evidence and Testimony
Since dismissal and default judgment are such extreme penalties, the Federal
Rules, and most states, also provide courts with the power to exclude spoliated
evidence and testimony that is related to that evidence.88 Although courts are
somewhat reluctant to dismiss a case or enter default judgment when spoliation has
occurred, exclusion of spoliated evidence and related testimony often achieves the
same goal, without the harsh consequences of dismissal.89 For example, a party that
has spoliated evidence will often be prohibited from offering expert testimony
related to the piece of evidence in question.90 But, because the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof on most issues, exclusion of evidence and related testimony is
generally not as effective a remedy where evidence has been totally destroyed
because total destruction makes it very difficult for the plaintiff to prove that the
evidence was favorable.91 Thus, for example, there is less of a need for the spoliating
party to present an expert witness to rebut the non-spoliating party’s claim, if the
non-spoliating party cannot prove what the evidence would have shown in the first
place.92
4. Monetary Sanctions
The Federal Rules, and most states, also allow courts to require a spoliator to pay
money for the destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence.93 Monetary
sanctions may be assessed in a number of situations. Some of the most common
82

Id. at 693.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

See id.

88

See FED. R. CIV. P. 37; see also Kindel & Richter, supra note 72, at 694.

89

Kindel & Richter, supra note 72, at 694.

90

See id.

91

Id.

92

See id.

93

Id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss2/10

10

2014]

SANCTIONS OR TORT?

511

situations include: assessing fees and costs associated with arguing evidentiary
motions and motions for sanctions, discovery costs associated with willful
destruction or concealment, and costs associated with exhausting a court’s time and
resources.94 In cases of egregious acts of spoliation, the court may also multiply
these monetary penalties in order to provide an adequate punishment to the
spoliator.95 Thus, monetary sanctions can be quite substantial if the spoliator’s
conduct is particularly flagrant.96 As a result, these punitive fines can operate as a
particularly good deterrent to potential spoliators.97
B. Criminal Statutes
A number of states, including Ohio, also have criminal statutes that make it a
crime to destroy, alter, or conceal evidence.98 For example, Ohio makes it a felony of
the third degree to “alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or
thing, with purpose to impair its value or availability as evidence in such proceeding
or investigation.”99 Ohio also makes it a crime to “[m]ake, present, or use any
record, document, or thing, knowing it to be false and with the purpose to mislead a
public official.”100 These statutes are designed to deter spoliation and apply equally
to parties involved in the litigation and third parties.101 However, the alleged
spoliator must know “that an official proceeding or investigation is in progress, or is
about to be or likely to be instituted.”102
Although criminal statutes are designed to deter and punish spoliation, some
commentators have suggested that, in practice, prosecutors are reluctant to pursue
criminal charges against spoliators in civil litigation because they are busy
prosecuting “real crimes.”103 The idea is that, in a civil case, punishment for
spoliation is more properly handled by the trial court judge.104 This view is just one
reason why some commentators have supported creating various types of
independent torts for spoliation.
94

Id.

95

Id. at 695-96.

96

Id. at 696.

97

See id.

98

See Hutchings, supra note 10, at 399.

99

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.12 (West 2013).

100

Id.

101

Levine, supra note 5, at 432 (“Another remedy that may persuade potential spoliators to
act otherwise is the fact that many jurisdictions have obstruction of justice statutes that cover
spoliation of evidence.”).
102

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.12 (West 2013).

103

Jonathan Judge, Reconsidering Spoliation: Common-Sense Alternatives to the
Spoliation Tort, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 441, 447 (2001) (“[C]ommentators have struggled to find
cases where a spoliator has been criminally prosecuted for destroying evidence in a civil case.
Part of the explanation lies with prosecutors, who are overwhelmed dealing with ‘real crime,’
and who no doubt see civil litigation spoliation as the trial judge’s problem.”).
104

Id.
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IV. TYPES OF INDEPENDENT SPOLIATION TORTS
When evidence relevant to litigation is destroyed or lost the consequences on the
party that the evidence favored can be severe. In some cases, the loss of a single
piece of critical evidence can prevent a party from proving a valid claim or defense.
Traditionally, as discussed above, courts have used sanctions, ranging from
discovery sanctions and presumptions to default, in an attempt to combat the harmful
effects of spoliation.105 Recently, however, a number of states have addressed
whether to recognize several variations of independent torts for spoliation.106 These
variations include first party intentional spoliation, third party intentional spoliation,
first party negligent spoliation, and third party negligent spoliation.107 The following
section will explore the different causes of action recognized in various states for
spoliation of evidence.
A. Intentional Spoliation
Intentional spoliation refers to evidence that has been destroyed, altered, or
concealed willfully for the purpose of disrupting the party’s case.108 It can refer to
evidence willfully destroyed, altered, or concealed by either a party to the litigation
or a third party that has undertaken a duty to preserve the evidence.109 The following
section will explore the two different types of intentional spoliation.
1. First Party Intentional Spoliation
A number of states, including Ohio, have recognized a tort for first party
intentional spoliation of evidence.110 First party intentional spoliation refers to the
willful destruction or alteration of evidence by a person who is a party to the
litigation for the purpose of defeating another party’s recovery.111 Generally, states
recognizing first party intentional spoliation agree that the elements include: (1)
pending or probable litigation involving the plaintiff; (2) knowledge on the part of
the defendant that litigation exists or is probable; (3) willful destruction of evidence
by defendant designed to disrupt the plaintiff’s case; (4) disruption of the plaintiff’s
case; and (5) damages proximately caused by the defendant’s acts.112
105

See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 37.

106

See supra notes 44-45.

107

See supra notes 44-48.

108

See supra note 1.

109
See Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993) (recognizing
independent tort for first party intentional spoliation and third party intentional spoliation); see
also Nichols v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 6 P.3d 300 (Alaska 2000); Hannah v. Heeter, 584
S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 2003) (recognizing first and third party intentional spoliation).
110

See Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d at 1038; see also Nichols, 6 P. 3d 300; Hannah,
584 S.E.2d 560.
111

See Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185, 189 (N.M. 1995), overruled by
Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 34 P.3d 1148 (N.M. 2001) (intentional spoliation is “the
intentional destruction, mutilation, or significant alteration of potential evidence for the
purpose of defeating another person’s recovery in a civil action”).
112

Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d at 1037.
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Ohio is one of only three states that recognize a cognizable tort for first party
intentional spoliation.113 The other two states are West Virginia and Alaska.114 These
states have traditionally given three main rationales for recognition of the tort: (1)
“Permitting the independent tort action promotes the desire to protect testimonial
candor and the integrity of the adversarial system;” (2) “the tort protects the probable
expectation of a favorable judgment or defense in future litigation;” and (3)
traditional remedies such as sanctions are not effective enough to deter spoliation.115
A majority of courts that have considered a tort for first-party intentional spoliation,
however, have rejected these rationales as insufficient to warrant recognition of the
tort.116
2. Third Party Intentional Spoliation
Third party intentional spoliation refers to evidence that is willfully destroyed or
altered by an individual who is not a party to the underlying suit.117 The elements of
third party intentional spoliation include: (1) the existence of a potential civil action;
(2) a legal or contractual duty resulting from a written contract, special relationship,
or court order, to preserve evidence which is relevant to that action; (3) destruction
of that evidence; (4) significant impairment in the ability to prove the potential civil
action; (5) a causal connection between the destruction of the evidence and the
inability to prove the lawsuit; (6) a significant possibility of success of the potential
civil action if the evidence were available; and (7) damages.118
Generally, states have been less reluctant to recognize independent torts for third
party spoliation.119 Courts have determined that the main distinction between first
and third party spoliation is the disparity in sanctions available for third party
spoliators.120 Although some sanctions are available against third parties, including
monetary and contempt sanctions, many sanctions, such as the adverse inference and
most discovery sanctions, are unavailable for use against a third party.121 Thus, states
recognizing third party intentional spoliation have reasoned that allowing a cause of
action will not only help deter spoliation, but will also create a remedy against a
third party where one would not otherwise be available.122
113

Id.

114

Nichols, 6 P.3d 300; Hannah, 584 S.E.2d 560.

115

See Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124, 1130 (Miss. 2002).

116

See supra note 40.

117

See Hannah, 584 S.E.2d at 571.

118

See Village of Roselle v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 859 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).

119

Id.

120

See Hannah, 584 S.E.2d at 571.

121

Stayton & Ray, supra note 57, at 31 (“The distinction between parties and nonparties is
premised on the idea that other remedies, such as spoliation inferences and discovery
sanctions, influence only litigants and leave third-party spoliators undeterred.”).
122

See Hannah, 584 S.E.2d at 571 (“[R]ecovery under a separate tort is necessary because
a third party is not subject to an adverse inference instruction or discovery sanctions. In regard
to a party to a civil action, we believe that intentional spoliation of evidence is misconduct of
such a serious nature, the existing remedies are not a sufficient response.”).
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B. Negligent Spoliation
In Bondu v. Gurvich, Florida became one of the first states to recognize the tort
of negligent spoliation.123 The Bondu Court noted that it would not need to “strike
out boldly” in creating a new tort because negligent spoliation could be stated under
existing negligence law.124 As the negligent spoliation tort began to evolve, however,
Florida courts began to recognize additional elements and no longer stated the claim
as a simple negligence cause of action.125 Some states do, however, hold that a claim
for negligent spoliation may be brought under existing negligence law.126 The
following section will explore the two different causes of action for negligent
spoliation.
1. First Party Negligent Spoliation
Several jurisdictions, at one point or another, have recognized a cause of action
for first party negligent spoliation.127 The majority of state courts that have addressed
the issue, however, have rejected first party negligent spoliation as a separate tort.128
Still, other states’ appellate courts have been split as to whether first party negligent
spoliation is a cognizable claim.129
States recognizing a separate cause of action for first party negligent spoliation
have generally stated the elements of the claim as follows: (1) existence of potential
civil action; (2) legal or contractual duty to preserve evidence which is relevant to
potential litigation; (3) destruction of that evidence; (4) significant impairment in
ability to prove the lawsuit; (5) causal relationship between evidence destruction and
ability to prove lawsuit; and (6) damages.130

123

See generally Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).

124

Id. at 1312.

125

See Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).

126

Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. 1995).

127
Foster v. Lawrence Mem’l Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831 (D. Kan. 1992) (applying Kansas
law); Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846 (D.C. 1998); Bondu, 473 So. 2d 1307.
128

See Sykes, supra note 19, at 848 (quoting Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 824 N.E.2d
349, 355 (Ind. 2005)) (“Most [states] hold that available remedies fairly compensate parties
harmed. Notwithstanding the policy considerations involved, they are ‘minimized by existing
remedies and outweighed by the attendant disadvantages.’”).
129

See Gicking v. Joyce Int’l Inc., 33 Pa. D. & C. 4th 208 (C.P. 1996) (recognizing cause
of action for negligent spoliation); see also Swick v. N.Y. Times Co., 815 A.2d 508 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (holding trial court erred in dismissing cause of action for
negligent spoliation); Manorcare Health Serv., Inc. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 764
A.2d 475 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (recognizing cause of action for negligent
spoliation). But see Rhoads v. Pottsville Hosp., 31 Pa. D. & C. 4th 500 (C.P. 1996) (declining
to recognize a cause of action for negligent spoliation); Urban v. Dollar Bank, 34 Pa. D. & C.
4th 11 (C.P. 1996) (declining to recognize either intentional or negligent spoliation).
130

Silhan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (N.D. Fla. 2002) (applying Florida

law).
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Like simple negligence claims, states that recognize claims for first party
negligent spoliation hold that the party must have a duty to preserve the evidence.131
Furthermore, no general duty to preserve exists, but a duty can arise out of an
agreement or contract, a statutory requirement, or an assumption of the duty by
affirmative conduct.132 If one of these duties applies, then a defendant owes a duty of
care to preserve evidence if a reasonable person in the defendant’s position should
have foreseen that the evidence was material to a potential civil action.133
2. Third Party Negligent Spoliation
Third party negligent spoliation is committed when a person or entity, that is not
a party to the underlying cause of action, has a duty to preserve evidence and fails to
do so.134 Several states, at one point or another, have recognized a cause of action for
third party negligent spoliation.135 Although very similar to first party negligent
spoliation, the elements of a cause of action for third party negligent spoliation differ
slightly. Most commonly, the elements are stated as follows: (1) the existence of a
pending or potential civil action; (2) the alleged spoliator had actual knowledge of
the pending or potential civil action; (3) a duty to preserve evidence arising from a
contract, agreement, statute, administrative rule, voluntary assumption of duty, or
other special circumstances; (4) spoliation of the evidence; (5) the spoliated evidence
was vital to a party’s ability to prevail in the pending or potential civil action; and (6)
damages.136
Once the first five elements are satisfied, there arises a rebuttable presumption
that, but for the fact of the spoliation, the party injured would have prevailed in the
pending or potential litigation.137 The third party must then overcome that rebuttable
presumption by introducing evidence that would support a finding that the opposing
party would not have won even if the spoliated evidence had been available.138 If the
defendant is able to rebut the presumption, the plaintiff must convince the jury that
the spoliated evidence was so important to his case that, without the evidence, the
claim would not have survived a motion for summary judgment.139
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Both proponents and detractors of the spoliation torts are able to assert valid
policy arguments for their respective positions. Specifically, there are seven different
131

Andersen v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 793 N.E.2d 962 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Wilhite v.
Thompson, 962 So. 2d 493 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
132

See Andersen, 793 N.E.2d at 966; Wilhite, 962 So. 2d at 498.

133

Andersen, 793 N.E.2d at 966.

134

See Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 19-20 (Mont. 1999).

135

Holmes v. Amrex Rent-A-Car, 180 F. 3d 294 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Hannah v. Heeter, 584
S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 2003); Oliver, 993 P.2d 11; Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267
(Ill. 1995).
136

Hannah, 584 S.E.2d at 570.

137

Id.

138

Id.

139

Id.
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policy arguments that courts have traditionally analyzed when deciding whether to
recognize spoliation as a separate cause of action. These policy arguments will be
explained in the section that follows.
A. Arguments in Favor of Independent Torts
There are three main policy arguments employed to advance the creation of
separate causes of action for spoliation. First, courts are constantly recognizing new
and nameless torts in order to properly compensate victims who ought to be afforded
protection by the law.140 Second, creating a separate spoliation torts deters future
spoliators from destroying evidence.141 Lastly, independent torts for spoliation
promote judicial integrity.142 The reasoning behind these policy arguments will be
explained below.
1. Policy of Creating New Torts to Adequately Compensate Aggrieved Parties
One of the main arguments used to advance the creation of separate causes of
action for spoliation is that courts are continually recognizing new tort actions to
remedy the “unreasonable interference with the interests of others.”143 Tort law is
“anything but static” and there are no limitations placed on its growth.144
Furthermore, “[w]hen it becomes clear that the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to
legal protection against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is
novel will not of itself operate as a bar to the remedy.”145 The primary rationale for
the constant evolution of tort law is that it allows a possible remedy where one may
not otherwise be available.146 Furthermore, courts have reasoned that an innocent
victim should “not be forced to suffer as a result of the spoliator’s actions.”147
This rationale was the main argument employed by the court in Smith v.
Superior Court, the first case to hold that an independent tort existed for intentional
spoliation.148 The court in that case held that “California has long recognized ‘[f]or
140
See Smith v. Super. Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d 829, 832 (Ct. App. 1984) (quoting
PROSSER, supra note 35, at § 1, pp. 3-4 (4th ed. 1971)) (“When it becomes clear that the
plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the defendant, the
mere fact that the claim is novel will not itself operate as a bar to a remedy.”).
141
See id. at 836 (finding that not allowing tort “encourage[s] violence and invite[s]
depredation”).
142

See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998) (“Destroying
evidence can destroy fairness and justice, for it increases the risk of an erroneous
decision . . . .”).
143

Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832; see also Levine, supra note 5, at 440-41.

144

Levine, supra note 5, at 440.

145

Id. at 440-41 (quoting PROSSER, supra note 35, at § 1, pp. 3-4 (4th ed. 1971)).

146

See Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832; see also Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 566 (W.
Va. 2003).
147
Stefan Rubin, Tort Reform: A Call for Florida to Scale Back its Independent Tort for
the Spoliation of Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 345, 365 (1999).
148

See Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (quoting PROSSER, supra note 35, at § 1, pp. 3-4)
(“Prosser instructs us that: ‘New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the
progress of the common law is marked by many cases of first impression, in which the court
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every wrong there is a remedy,’ and has allowed for new torts through legislative
and judicial process.”149 As the Smith court recognized, examples of such new torts
include: intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, infliction of
prenatal injuries, and the alienation of the affections of a parent.150
Although courts have used this rationale for all forms of the spoliation tort,
courts have indicated that this rationale applies with more force to third party
spoliators than to first party spoliators.151 The rationale is more fitting for third party
spoliators because traditional sanctions, such as adverse inferences and default
judgment, are not available against third parties who have no stake in the
litigation.152 Thus, to prevent innocent victims of spoliation from going
uncompensated, some jurisdictions have found it necessary to recognize independent
torts for spoliation caused by third parties.
2. Deterrence
Another major argument in favor of creating separate causes of action for
spoliation is that the torts help to further deter the destruction of evidence.153 Courts
universally condemn spoliation as destroying the integrity of the justice system.154
However, they disagree as to whether traditional methods of combatting spoliation
are adequate to deter future destruction of evidence.155 For example, in Smith v.
Superior Court, the court found that to deny a party the opportunity to bring separate
torts for spoliation is “[t]o deny the injured party the right to recover any actual
damages . . . encourage[ing] violence and invite[ing] depredation.”156 As did the
Smith Court, the majority of courts that have recognized independent causes of
action for spoliation reason that traditional sanctions and criminal statutes are
inadequate to deter the destruction of evidence.157 Proponents of the torts claim that
if the spoliated evidence is extremely detrimental to a litigant’s case, the rewards for

has struck out boldly to create a cause of action, where none had been recognized
before . . . .’”).
149

Id.

150

Id.

151

See Levine, supra note 5, at 435.

152

Id.

153

Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836; see also Dowdle Butane Gas Co., Inc. v. Moore, 831 So.
2d 1124, 1130 (Miss. 2002).
154

See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511, 515 (Cal. 1998).

155

Steffen Nolte, The Spoliation Tort: An Approach to Underlying Principles, 26 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 351, 402 (1995) (“[C]onventional remedies such as the adverse inference or court
sanctions provide only limited deterrence to willful spoliation.”).
156

Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836.

157

Sykes, supra note 19, at 846-47 (“Since penalties are often lenient, the ‘bad man’ will
spoliate evidence because the harshness of the penalties do not outweigh the advantage he will
gain by spoliating. Because of this unfortunate reality, commentators argue that the adoption
of an independent tort of spoliation will curtail such conduct and provide harsher penalties.”).
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spoliation far outweigh the risks posed by traditional remedies.158 One commentator
has even stated that “[t]he bad faith spoliator has nothing to lose and much to
gain.”159 Thus, courts have reasoned that allowing independent torts for spoliation
increases the severity of punishment and therefore adds greater deterrence than
traditional remedies.160
Scholars recognize that, at least in theory, sanctions are the most “diverse and
tailored remedies.”161 Some, however, have suggested that, in reality, sanctions have
limitations on their usefulness and that these limitations also reduce their deterrent
effects.162 Specifically, sanctions under the Federal Rules and most state laws can
only be awarded for violations of a court order or subpoena.163 As a result,
proponents of the spoliation torts argue that courts are powerless to punish spoliation
that occurs prior to the grant of a motion to compel.164 Discovery sanctions also do
not apply to spoliation that occurs prior to the commencement of litigation.165 Thus,
supporters of the spoliation tort argue that traditional sanctions only encourage a
spoliator to destroy the evidence as quickly as possible, rather than to preserve it.166
Supporters of the spoliation torts also argue that criminal statutes addressing the
destruction of evidence are not as effective in deterring spoliation as one would
think. In actuality, “commentators have struggled to find cases where a spoliator has
been criminally prosecuted for destroying evidence in a civil case.”167 Instead, they
have found that prosecutors are too busy dealing with “real crimes” and view
spoliation as the “trial judge’s problem.”168 These considerations have led some

158

Nolte, supra note 155, at 401 (“When particular evidence is severely detrimental to a
party’s case, there may be little incentive to preserve the evidence if production would cause
the party to lose” and “a risk benefit analysis might encourage an adverse party to choose the
spoliation alternative.”).
159

Id.

160

Id. at 402 (“The potential for general or punitive damages significantly increases the
severity of punishment, thereby increasing the liability a potential spoliator expects.”).
161

Judge, supra note 103, at 446.

162

Id.; Stayton & Ray, supra note 57, at 32 (“There are two inherent limits to the
effectiveness of the discovery sanctions as a remedy for spoliation: they can be applied only
after litigation has commenced and only to parties in a case.”).
163

Judge, supra note 103, at 446.

164

Id.

165

Id.

166

Id. (“[T]he primary message sent to the potential spoliator . . . may not be to preserve
evidence, but rather to destroy it as quickly as possible.”).
167
Id. at 447; see also Nolte, supra note 155, at 355 (“Criminal obstruction-of-justice
statutes provide only theoretical deterrence, as the absence of case law demonstrates . . . .”).
168
Judge, supra note 103, 447 (“Part of the explanation lies with prosecutors, who are
overwhelmed dealing with ‘real crime,’ and who no doubt see civil litigation spoliation as the
trial judge's problem.”); see also Sykes, supra note 19, at 847 (“Since today's criminal justice
system is overwhelmed by felony cases and pursuit of the ‘big fish,’ there is little time or
resources to expend on spoliation prosecutions.”)
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states to adopt the spoliation torts in order to provide additional deterrence to the
destruction of evidence.
3. Judicial Integrity
Another policy argument typically made by proponents of spoliation torts is that
they promote judicial integrity. The judicial integrity argument is closely related to
the compensation and deterrence rationales discussed above. Courts universally
recognize that spoliation threatens the integrity of the judicial system because it
increases the chances of erroneous decisions.169 Supporters of the torts argue that
allowing separate causes of action for spoliation will increase the judicial integrity of
the courts by deterring future spoliation, and thus, by decreasing the chances of
wrong decisions.170 Furthermore, these supporters argue that judicial integrity will
also be served by creating a remedy for every wrong committed against a victim who
the law affords protection.171
B. Arguments Against Separate Torts
Although proponents of independent torts for spoliation advance several valid
arguments, critics of the torts also have legitimate policy arguments that call into
question the wisdom of recognizing these torts. The three most prominent arguments
espoused by courts and commentators are that the spoliation torts are inherently
speculative, they violate the policy against recognizing derivative tort remedies, and
that traditional remedies are adequate to both deter and remedy spoliation.172 These
arguments as well as others will be discussed below.
1. Speculative Nature
One major problem courts have with recognizing independent torts for spoliation
is that the torts, by their very nature, are inherently speculative.173 In other words,
even if a party can prove that evidence was intentionally destroyed, the court can
never be certain as to what that evidence would have shown and how much the
evidence would have weighed in the spoliation victim’s favor.174 Without knowing
the exact contents of the evidence, it is impossible for a jury to meaningfully assess
what role the missing evidence would have had.175 Thus, the jury is left to speculate

169

See Rubin, supra note 147, at 364.

170

See Smith v. Super. Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 836 (“Deterrence is an important policy
consideration for allowing the maintenance of suits when damages cannot be shown with
certainty.”).
171

See id. at 832.

172

Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511, 515 (Cal. 1998) (“Three concerns in
particular stand out here: the conflict between a tort remedy for intentional first party
spoliation and the policy against creating derivative tort remedies for litigation-related
misconduct; the strength of existing nontort remedies for spoliation; and the uncertainty of the
fact of harm in spoliation cases.”).
173

See id. at 518.

174

See id.

175

Id.
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as to what the missing evidence would have shown and what effect it would have
had on the outcome of the underlying litigation.176 One court went so far as to say:
It is impossible to know what the destroyed evidence would have shown.
. . . It would seem to be sheer guesswork, even presuming that the
destroyed evidence went against the spoliator, to calculate what it would
have contributed to the plaintiff’s success on the merits of the underlying
lawsuit. . . . The lost evidence may have concerned a relevant, but
relatively trivial matter. If evidence would not have helped to establish
plaintiff’s case, an award of damages for its destruction would work a
windfall for the plaintiff.177
Courts and commentators have also noted that, in addition to receiving a possible
windfall, the inherently speculative nature of the torts may lead to erroneous
decisions and inconsistency.178 Furthermore, along with the speculative nature as to
whether the plaintiff’s case was in fact harmed by the spoliation, speculation also
exists as to the amount of damages that the original jury would have awarded absent
the spoliation.179 Thus, critics of the torts argue that they cannot accurately
compensate victims or “correct errors in the determination of the issues in the
underlying litigation.”180
2. Derivative Tort Remedies
Traditionally, courts have followed a policy of not recognizing derivative torts,
which are those based on litigation-related misconduct in an underlying case.181 The
rational behind the courts’ non-recognition of derivative tort remedies is rooted in
procedural and policy considerations that are not present in traditional tort actions.182
In particular, courts have generally recognized that derivative tort remedies based on
litigation misconduct work to further prolong litigation.183 For example, the Supreme
Court of California has found that creating independent torts for spoliation
“encourages a spiral of lawsuits” because allowing derivative tort remedies increases
176

Id. at 518.

177

See id. at 518-19.

178

See Stayton & Ray, supra note 57, at 33.

179

See id. (The jury in an independent tort action would not only have to infer what the
destroyed evidence might have proven but also have to determine what the original jury might
have given the nonspoliating party had this evidence been presented to the original jury.).
180

Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 519.

181

See id.; see also Levine, supra note 5, at 441 (recognizing derivative torts as
inefficient).
182
Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 515 (“[The] inquiry into whether to create a tort
remedy for the intentional spoliation of evidence must begin with the recognition that using
tort law to correct misconduct arising during litigation raises policy considerations not present
in deciding whether to create tort remedies for harms arising in other contexts.”).
183
Id.; see also Nolte, supra note 155, at 398 (“[C]reation of a new cause of action [for
spoliation] increases the likelihood of litigation. With an increase in lawsuits, social costs
would necessarily escalate as well.”).
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the filing of frivolous claims.184 Courts have found that derivative torts increase the
filing of frivolous lawsuits because, in any lawsuit, evidence will inevitably be lost
or unavailable and, as a result, spoliation torts invite disappointed litigants to
essentially retry their cases.185
In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, the court suggested that recognizing
independent torts for spoliation could over-burden the justice system: “To allow a
litigant to attack the integrity of evidence after the proceedings have concluded . . .
would impermissibly burden, if not inundate, our justice system.”186 The same court
also recognized many similarities between spoliation and perjury, in that they both
work to undermine judicial integrity and the fact-finding process.187 However, courts
have long recognized that “it would be productive of endless litigation” to permit the
victim of perjury to bring an independent cause of action for damages.188 The
rationale behind not recognizing independent causes of action for perjury and
spoliation rests on the concern that doing so would diminish judicial integrity by
disregarding “the finality of adjudication.”189
3. Adequacy of Traditional Remedies
Along with the policy considerations discussed in the previous sections, most
courts that have declined to recognize the various torts for spoliation have reasoned
that traditional remedies are adequate to combat the destruction of evidence.190 In
fact, a majority of state courts have found that traditional sanctions are a preferred
remedy because they can be narrowly tailored to a specific set of circumstances,191
and have noted that state legislatures remain free to create additional sanctions to
combat spoliation as needed.192 In addition to sanctions, many states have criminal

184

See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 515.

185

See id.

186

Id. at 516.

187

Id. (“Perjury, like spoliation, undermines the search for truth and fairness by creating a
false picture of the evidence before the trier of fact.”); see also Levine, supra note 5, at 446
(“Another reason given not to adopt the spoliation tort, and that can also be reduced to the
court system’s desire to see an end to litigation, is that destruction of evidence is similar to
perjury or embracery ‘in that both undermine the integrity of a trial; yet, there are no
independent torts recognized for these crimes.’”).
188

Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 516 (quoting Smith v. Lewis, 3 Johns. 57, 168
(N.Y. 1808)).
189

Id. at 516; see also id. at 517 (quoting Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 133-34 (1891))
(“Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than
occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .”).
190

See supra note 135.

191

Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 515 (“[W]e have favored remedying litigationrelated misconduct by sanctions imposed within the underlying lawsuit rather than by creating
new derivative torts.”); see also Levine, supra note 5, at 441 (“Perhaps the strongest argument
against the adoption of most variations of the spoliation tort is that there are various remedies
and claims already available that can sufficiently handle instances of spoliation of evidence.”).
192

See Judge, supra note 103, at 462.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014

21

522

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:501

statutes that address spoliation.193 Since the willful destruction of evidence does not
appear to be widespread, the majority of courts have thus found that these remedies
are generally adequate to address the problem of spoliation.194
Specifically, courts reason that the adverse inference is the best way to both deter
and remedy spoliation because it more appropriately places the victim in his original
position by simply instructing the jury to infer that the evidence would have been
favorable.195 In addition to the adverse inference, detractors of independent torts for
spoliation argue that other sanctions, such as discovery and monetary sanctions, are
powerful weapons to be used against spoliators.196 Thus, critics of the tort argue that
victims of spoliation remain free to pursue a variety of remedies to provide proper
compensation.
4. Private Property Concerns
Another problem with recognizing independent torts for spoliation is that, in
many cases, the spoliated evidence will be a third party’s private property.197
Obviously, this is especially problematic in cases of third party spoliation.198 In such
cases, the third party is directed to preserve as evidence his own property.199 Since
“[a] property owner normally has the right to control and dispose of his property as
he sees fit[,] [t]he owner of the property may legitimately question what right a
plaintiff has to direct control over such property.”200 Allowing claims for third party
intentional spoliation may undermine the fundamental right of that party to control
his own property as he sees fit.
Additionally, aside from being unable to control one’s own property, there can be
significant costs associated with the preservation of evidence. Specifically, the costs
associated with “causing persons or entities to take extraordinary measures to
193

See supra note 58; see also Levine supra note 5, at 432.

194

Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 518 (“The infrequency of spoliation suggests that
existing remedies are generally effective at deterring spoliation.”).
195

Id. (“There are a number of nontort remedies that seek to punish and deter the
intentional spoliation of evidence. Chief among these is the evidentiary inference that
evidence which one party has destroyed or rendered unavailable was unfavorable to that
party.”); see also Levine, supra note 5, at 441 (“The spoliation inference . . . has been deemed
superior to the tort on the grounds that is ‘more efficient, it avoids the horrors of derivative
litigation, and it does the best job of fairly compensating the victimized party.’”).
196

See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 517 (“The sanctions under Code of Civil
Procedure section 2023 are potent. They include monetary sanctions, contempt sanctions,
issue sanctions ordering that designated facts be taken as established or precluding the
offending party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, evidence
sanctions prohibiting the offending party from introducing designated matters into evidence,
and terminating sanctions that include striking part or all of the pleadings, dismissing part or
all of the action, or granting a default judgment against the offending party.”).
197

See Bart S. Wilhoit, Spoliation of Evidence: The Viability of Four Emerging Torts, 46
UCLA L. REV. 631, 671 (1998).
198

Id.

199

Id.

200

Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 18 (Mont. 1999).
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preserve for an indefinite period . . . things of no apparent value solely to avoid the
possibility of spoliation liability if years later those items turn out to have some
potential relevance to future litigation.”201 Critics of the spoliation torts argue that
requiring third parties to preserve such evidence is simply too burdensome and that
the lack of remedies for spoliation committed by third parties is over-exaggerated.202
VI. OHIO LAW
In 1993, Ohio became one of the few states to recognize independent causes of
action for spoliation.203 Specifically, the Supreme Court of Ohio held, in Smith v.
Howard Johnson Co., Inc., that Ohio recognizes separate causes of action for both
first party and third party intentional spoliation.204 The court was not, however, clear
as to whether the holding extended to negligent spoliation.205
Although the court in Howard Johnson was directly asked whether Ohio
recognizes intentional or negligent spoliation, whether the court actually extended its
holding to include negligent spoliation is unclear.206 Instead, the court’s holding is
ambiguous, simply stating: “[a] cause of action exists in tort for interference with or
destruction of evidence.”207 Some appellate courts, however, have since addressed
the issue and have found that Ohio does not recognize separate torts for negligent
spoliation.208
Typically, in Ohio, a claim for spoliation must be brought during the underlying
cause of action.209 A case for intentional spoliation may be brought after the
underlying suit only if the spoliation was discovered after the conclusion of the
primary cause of action.210 The limitation on when a cause of action for spoliation
may be brought is undoubtedly designed to alleviate some of the above-discussed
policy concerns associated with derivative torts.211
VII. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following section will analyze the merits of the policy considerations
discussed in the previous sections and will apply them to the various types of
spoliation torts. Specifically, in light of these policy arguments, the following section

201

Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 519.

202

See Judge, supra note 103, at 459.

203

See generally Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993).

204

Id.

205

See id.

206

Id.

207

Id. at 1038.

208

See Woodell v. Ormet Primary Aluminum Corp., No. 03 MO 7, 2005 WL 2033285
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2005); see also Drawl v. Cornicelli, 706 N.E.2d 849 (Ohio Ct. App.
1997).
209

See Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 756 N.E.2d 657, 660 (Ohio 2001).

210

Id.

211

See id.
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will explore whether Ohio should recognize any of the different causes of action for
spoliation.
A. Ohio Should Cease to Recognize Independent Torts for Intentional Spoliation of
Evidence
Ohio should overturn its recognition of torts for both first and third party
intentional spoliation. In recognizing separate causes of action for spoliation, it
appears that Ohio fell into the same trap as California and Florida. Namely, being
overzealous to recognize new tort remedies without fully considering the problems
posed by their recognition. Conspicuously lacking in the court’s one page opinion in
Howard Johnson, is any discussion of the policy considerations discussed in the
previous section.212 What is clear, however, is that those policy considerations weigh
against recognizing independent tort remedies for intentional spoliation. The
following section will seek to prove that the problems associated with recognizing
torts for intentional spoliation far outweigh the benefits.
1. Recognizing Independent Torts for Intentional Spoliation Does Little to Further
Deter the Willful Destruction of Evidence
One of the main rationales employed by proponents of the independent tort for
intentional spoliation is that the tort will help to further deter the willful destruction
of evidence.213 Proponents argue that traditional remedies do not adequately deter
spoliation because the penalties are not harsh enough,214 as they do not extend to pretrial litigation and criminal statutes are rarely enforced.215
While discovery sanctions do not extend to pre-trial spoliation, courts
nonetheless have the inherent authority to impose a wide variety of sanctions and are
typically given broad discretion to do so.216 These sanctions include monetary
sanctions that can be multiplied for punitive purposes, adverse inferences, default
judgment, and dismissal, among others.217 It is difficult to imagine that there exists
any harsher penalty than default judgment or dismissal, especially considering that
monetary penalties also remain available for punitive purposes.218 Additionally, as
the court in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center noted, although the discovery sanctions
generally do not extend to pre-trial spoliation, the vast majority of spoliation occurs
during discovery.219 Thus, “there is no reason to conclude that instances of spoliation
that remain hidden during discovery . . . would come to light afterward solely
[because] of the existence of a tort remedy.”220 Furthermore, given the tort’s
212

See generally Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993).

213

See supra Part V.A.2.

214

See supra Part V.A.2.

215

See supra Part V.A.2.

216

See supra Part III.A.

217

See supra Part III.A.

218

See supra Parts III.A.2, 4.

219

See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511, 520-21 (Cal. 1998).

220

Id.
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speculative nature,221 it is unlikely that tort remedies would increase deterrence “by
more accurately compensating the spoliation victim and thus reducing the benefit to
the spoliator.”222
In most jurisdictions, prosecutors also maintain the right to prosecute intentional
spoliators.223 Just because they are reluctant to do so, does not justify the creation of
independent torts for spoliation. Furthermore, state legislatures are also free to create
further sanctions that would help deter future spoliation. Creating a separate cause of
action for first party intentional spoliation, therefore, is unnecessary because it will
not be of any greater deterrence than traditional remedies.
However, the deterrence rational does apply with more force to intentional third
party spoliation because many of the traditional sanctions available against a party to
the lawsuit are not available against third parties.224 “This issue is particularly
important to tort proponents because it is really their last line of defense—without a
spoliation tort, there may be no civil remedy to compensate a litigant who is
victimized by a nonparty spoliator.”225
Although a number of jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, Alabama,
and Montana, have accepted this rationale, it is generally unfounded.226 Courts have
noted that in most instances where a third party spoliator intentionally destroys
evidence, he will not be a complete stranger to the litigation and will have some
stake in the outcome of the case.227 Otherwise, the third party would have little, if
any, incentive to intentionally destroy evidence important to the litigation.228 In fact,
California appears to be one of the only states that have confronted a case involving
221

See supra Part V.B.1.

222

See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 521.

223

See supra Part III.B.

224

See generally Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 17-18 (Mont. 1999) (“When
evidence is in possession of a third party . . . the various sanctions available to the trial judge
are inapplicable and other considerations arise.”). See also Levine, supra note 5, at 445
(“[Traditional] remedies . . . appear to be at least as adequate as a tort for spoliation of
evidence would be and account for all instances of spoliation except for intentional spoliation
by a third party.”); see also Judge, supra note 103, at 459 (“Unlike spoliation by parties to the
lawsuit, which can be neutralized and punished with an evidentiary inference, sanctions or
both, nonparties are generally not subject to these remedies.”).
225

Judge, supra note 103, at 459.

226

See Oliver, 993 P.2d 11 (recognizing cause of action for third party intentional
spoliation and third party negligent spoliation); see also Holmes v. Amrex Rent-A-Car, 180 F.
3d 294 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (recognizing independent tort for negligent third-party spoliation);
Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d. 429 (Ala. 2000) (recognizing cause of action for third party
negligent spoliation); Judge, supra note 103, at 459.
227
See Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124, 1132 (Miss. 2002) (discussing
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court); see also Judge, supra note 103, at 461
(“[T]he chance that valuable evidence will end up in the possession of someone with
absolutely no interest in litigation between the primary parties is extremely slim.”).
228
Dowdle Butane Gas Co., 831 So. 2d at 1132 (“[I]n many instances . . . the third party
spoliator may not be a total stranger to the litigation, as there is little motivation to spoliate
where the third party is wholly divorced from the litigation.”).
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an uninterested third party at all.229 Instead, it is far more likely that a third party will
have some sort of agency relationship with one of the litigants, in which case
sanctions may be imputed to that litigant.230 For example, where a party’s expert
witness destroys or alters evidence, the court may impose the sanction of evidence
preclusion and forbid the expert from testifying on what that evidence may or may
not have shown.231
As indicated above, the need for an independent tort for third party intentional
spoliation is largely exaggerated. Courts that have realized this exaggeration have
shown that there are traditional remedies available to victims of third party spoliation
and that the victim is not “entirely helpless.”232 In the rare case where a third party
intentional spoliator is a complete stranger to litigation, monetary and contempt
sanctions are available to deter future spoliators.233 Furthermore, if the plaintiff truly
faces a situation where a third party is in possession of valuable evidence, the
plaintiff could arguably still resort to “quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, and essentially file
suit against the piece of evidence itself.”234 The plaintiff could then seek a
preliminary injunction or even a temporary restraining order against the party in
possession of the evidence, which would force them to preserve it.235 Lastly,
although prosecutors are often reluctant to pursue criminal charges against a
spoliator in civil litigation,236 they remain free to do so against third parties, while
allowing the trial judge to handle spoliation issues that arise between the parties of
the underlying suit. Thus, the fear that there are little or no remedies in place to
adequately deter intentional third-party spoliation is clearly without basis.
2. The Derivative Nature of the Torts Poses Problems that Far Outweigh Any
Benefits Associated with Recognizing Independent Torts for Intentional Spoliation
As discussed above, one of the main rationales behind the recognition of
independent torts for intentional spoliation is that tort law is constantly coming up
with “new and nameless” torts to compensate victims that have been wronged.237
However, courts also have a longstanding policy against recognizing derivative torts
based on litigation-related misconduct.238 This policy concern is rooted in procedural
concerns that are not present with traditional tort remedies.239

229

Judge, supra note 103, at 459.

230
Id. (“[T]he laws of agency typically will allow the court to impute sanctions to one of
the parties.”).
231

Id.

232

Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Super. Ct., 976 P.2d 223, 232 (Cal. 1999).

233

Id.

234

Judge, supra note 103, at 461.

235

Id.

236

See supra Part V.A.II.

237

See supra Part V.A.I.

238

See supra Part V.B.II.
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Cedars-Sinai Med, Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511, 514-15 (Cal. 1998).
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Specifically, derivative torts work to prolong litigation and “encourage[] a spiral
of lawsuits.”240 Derivative tort remedies for intentional spoliation are also subject to
abuse because in many cases, potentially relevant evidence will no longer be
available at the time of trial simply because it was inadvertently lost or misplaced.241
The mere fact that evidence is unavailable allows disappointed litigants to sue the
prevailing party for spoliation, regardless of whether the evidence was lost or
destroyed intentionally.242 This appears to be the case in Ohio, as a non-exhaustive
look at spoliation cases in the state appears to show that the vast majority of claims
fail to make it past summary judgment on the issue of willful spoliation.243 It appears
that California’s fear that allowing independent torts for spoliation “would
impermissibly burden, if not inundate our justice system” may be coming to fruition
in Ohio.244 Since it appears that very few spoliation cases are actually successful in
Ohio, the argument that a large quantity of spoliation victims will go
uncompensated, if not for the tort, loses much of its luster.
Furthermore, even in the rare case where the plaintiff does have a meritorious
cause of action for spoliation, there are a number of additional problems associated
with the torts. Aside from the policy issues discussed above, there are also
procedural issues that come along with recognizing derivative tort remedies, and
240

Id. at 515.

241

Id. at 519 (“A separate tort remedy would be subject to abuse, for in many cases
potentially relevant evidence will no longer exist at the time of trial, not because it was
intentionally destroyed but simply because it has been discarded or misplaced in the ordinary
course of events.”).
242

Id. at 520 (“The mere fact of destruction . . . would permit a disappointed litigant to sue
the prevailing party for spoliation, [even though] in many cases the issue of the defendant's
purpose in destroying the evidence [is uncertain] . . . .”); see also James F. Thompson,
Spoliation of Evidence: A Troubling New Tort, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 563, 592 (1989) (“A new
cause of action could accrue each time a plaintiff loses a lawsuit, for in most cases there is
likely to be some place of potential evidence that is not available at the time of trial.”).
243

See Thomas v. Cleveland Clinic Found., No. 85276, 2005 WL 2100922 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 1, 2005) (affirming directed verdict because failed to show evidence destroyed
willfully); see also Sivinski v. Kelley, No. 94296, 2011 WL 1744262 (Ohio Ct. App. May 5,
2011); Allstate Ins. Co. v. QED Consultants, Inc., No. 09CA14, 2009 WL 2973503 (Ohio Ct.
App. Sept. 16, 2009) (finding plaintiff failed to show willful spoliation); Mitchell v. Norwalk
Area Health Servs., No. H-05-002, 2004 WL 2415995 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2005) (finding
no evidence destruction of evidence done willfully); Woodell v. Ormet Primary Aluminum
Corp., No. 03 MO 7, 2005 WL 2033285 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2005); Bugg v. Am.
Standard, Inc., No. 84829, 2005 WL 1245043 (Ohio Ct. App. May 26, 2005) (finding plaintiff
failed to show third element that evidence destroyed willfully); Boggs v. The Scotts Co., No.
04AP-425, 2005 WL 647560 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2005) (finding no support for claim
defendant deliberately destroyed evidence); Wachtman v. Meijer, No. 03AP-948, 2004 WL
2757832 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004) (finding plaintiff failed to allege willful destruction of
evidence); Ciganick v. Kaley, No. 2004-P-0001, 2004 WL 2580593 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 12,
2004) (finding plaintiff failed to show spoliation was willful); Tate v. Adena Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
801 N.E. 2d. 930 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (finding plaintiff failed to show destruction was
willful); White v. Ford Motor Co., 755 N.E. 2d. 954 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (finding plaintiff
failed to show evidence willfully destroyed). But see White v. Equity, Inc., 945 N.E. 2d. 536
(Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (finding plaintiff set forth claim for spoliation).
244

See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 516.
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specifically, torts for spoliation. Mainly, states vary at what point a cause of action
for spoliation against a party to the underlying claim may be brought. Ohio typically
only allows the spoliation tort to be brought during the underlying action unless the
spoliation is not discovered until after the underlying suit has concluded.245 Other
states, however, allow the tort for spoliation to be brought after the underlying suit
regardless of when the spoliation was discovered.246
Although requiring the suit to be brought during the underlying cause of action
necessarily hastens the litigation process, it also poses other problems, such as jury
confusion and inconsistency.247 Jury confusion occurs because the jury must decide
two different claims, with overlapping issues and evidence, at the same time.248 This
process begins with the jury first having to decide the underlying claim and whether
to apply an adverse inference to the spoliated evidence.249 In deciding the underlying
claim, one of two decisions can be made: (1) application of the adverse inference is
warranted; or (2) application of the adverse inference is unwarranted.250 Either way
the decision turns, it appears, at least theoretically, that an alleged spoliation victim
should not be able to recover under the spoliation tort if the jury is consistent.251
For example, if the application of the adverse inference is warranted, it
necessarily must have been decided that the evidence was both significant and
destroyed intentionally.252 Once the adverse inference is granted, in order to show
damages in the subsequent tort claim, the alleged spoliation victim must lose the
underlying case, despite the granting of the adverse inference.253 However, in
deciding that the spoliation victim still loses, it must have necessarily been decided
that, despite inferring a reasonable interpretation of what the evidence would have
shown, the spoliation victim still cannot state a claim.254 If the jury is consistent
during the subsequent spoliation tort, it appears it necessarily must decide that the
missing evidence was not the proximate cause of the victim losing the underlying
case because it assumed the missing evidence’s importance and veracity and the
spoliation victim still lost.255 Thus, it appears that if the adverse inference is granted
245

See supra Part VI.

246

See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 516.

247

Id. at 520.

248

See id.

249

Id.

250

Id.

251

See id.

252
See supra Part III.A.1 (Courts will generally find the granting of an adverse inference
appropriate only if the following elements are satisfied: “(1) an act of destruction; (2)
discoverability of the evidence; (3) an intent to destroy the evidence; (4) occurrence of the act
at a time after suit has been filed, or, if before filing, at a time when the finding is fairly
perceived as imminent.”)
253

See supra Part IV (All forms of the spoliation tort require the alleged victim to lose the
underlying suit in order to show damages.).
254

See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 520.

255

See id; see also supra Part IV (All forms of the spoliation tort require the spoliation
plaintiff to prove proximate cause.).
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at all during the underlying claim, the alleged spoliation victim should not be able to
prevail during the subsequent tort action if the jury is consistent.
If, however, it is decided that application of the adverse inference in the
underlying suit is unwarranted, it must have necessarily been found that either the
spoliation was unintentional or the evidence was insignificant. 256 If the spoliation
was unintentional, then the alleged spoliation victim cannot bring an independent
tort in Ohio because Ohio only recognizes intentional spoliation as a separate
claim.257 Likewise, if the evidence is not significant enough to warrant the adverse
inference, then it most likely is not the proximate cause of the alleged victim’s
failure to prove his case.258 Again, if the jury is consistent during the subsequent tort
action, then it appears that a spoliation victim should not be able to prevail if the
adverse inference is found to be unwarranted either.259 Thus, theoretically, if the jury
is consistent during the subsequent tort claim, the spoliation plaintiff should not
recover regardless of the scenario. “At the least, this would be confusing to the jury;
at most, it would lead to inconsistent results.”260
As demonstrated above, trying a tort case for spoliation simultaneously with the
underlying claim poses multiple problems; however, requiring the tort case for
spoliation to commence after the underlying suit is also problematic because it
prolongs litigation. The spoliation action would essentially be a retrial of the
underlying claim because all of the evidence would have to be presented again for
the jury to properly determine the effect that the spoliated evidence would have had
on the outcome of the case.261 In sum, it appears that, although in some instances
spoliation torts might advance judicial integrity, the vast majority of cases will only
serve to overwhelm our justice system and drain its resources.
3. Traditional Methods are Better at Accurately Compensating Victims of Intentional
Spoliation Because the Tort is Inherently Speculative
Supporters of independent torts for intentional spoliation also argue that the torts
promote judicial integrity by providing remedies to compensate victims where they
may not otherwise be available.262 However, just because the torts “compensate”
victims, does not mean that they promote judicial integrity by doing so accurately.
As critics of the intentional spoliation tort have suggested, the speculative nature of
the torts not only calls into question whether the plaintiff was in fact harmed by the
spoliation, it also is speculative as to the amount of damages that should be
awarded.263 Furthermore, critics of the spoliation tort have noted that the inherently
speculative nature of the tort may lead to erroneous decisions, windfall for the
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See supra note 252.
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See supra Part VI.

258

See supra Part IV.
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Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 514-15.
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See supra Part V.A.1.
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See supra Part V.B.1.
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plaintiff, and inconsistency.264 For example, theoretically, in cases of third-party
spoliation, both parties could file suit against a third party and, because of the
speculative nature of the tort, both could argue that the evidence would have been
favorable to him.265 As a result, the majority of courts have found that traditional
methods of combatting spoliation are superior to the spoliation torts.266
Specifically, the adverse inference more accurately compensates victims of
spoliation and thus is a superior remedy for cases of intentional spoliation.267 The
adverse inference more accurately places the party in its original position, rather than
obsessing over creating a separate remedy.268 Instead of seeking to provide a remedy
that is speculative at best, the adverse inference “gives the aggrieved party the
benefit of the doubt created,” which allows the jury to assess the proper remedy.269
In addition to the adverse inference, courts have broad discretion to tailor other
remedies to the specific circumstances of the case, including issue preclusion and
monetary sanctions.270 In egregious cases, where an adverse inference and monetary
sanctions are not enough, courts are also free to dismiss the case or enter default
judgment.271 Thus, there is little reason to recognize a separate cause of action for
first party intentional spoliation.
As discussed above, although many of the traditional sanctions do not apply to
third parties, it is extremely unlikely that a third party with absolutely no ties to the
underlying claim will be in possession of crucial evidence.272 Furthermore, if the
party has absolutely no stake in the underlying cause of action there is little
motivation for a third party to intentionally destroy evidence.273 Traditional
sanctions, therefore, can serve to adequately compensate victims of third party
intentional spoliation. As a result, Ohio would be wise to overrule its decision in
Howard Johnson and stop recognizing both first and third party intentional
spoliation.
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B. Ohio Should Not Recognize Independent Torts for Negligent Spoliation of
Evidence
So far, Ohio has refused to recognize causes of action for first and third party
negligent spoliation,274 and it should continue to do so. Although some of the
problems that arise with intentional spoliation are not present when it comes to
negligent spoliation, many of the same, and additional problems, are associated with
negligent spoliation. These problems will be discussed below in relation to the
policy arguments asserted by proponents of negligent spoliation.
Although an argument can be made that independent torts for intentional
spoliation are necessary to further deter future spoliation, that argument has little, if
any, merit for claims of negligent spoliation. Commentators have found that “tort
liability for negligent acts adds little to deterrence because most individuals are
rarely involved in tortious situations and, therefore, have little incentive to learn how
to avoid tortious behavior.”275 Thus, the idea that creation of an independent tort for
negligent spoliation will cause people to be more careful with evidence is tenuous at
best.
Moreover, creation of independent torts for negligent spoliation would create
unnecessary duties on individuals to preserve evidence.276 A third party in
possession of potentially relevant evidence would be forced to carefully preserve that
evidence even though it ultimately may have no bearing on the case.277 Otherwise,
he may be opening himself up to potential litigation even though the evidence was
not destroyed for the purpose of disrupting the party’s case.278 Furthermore, in cases
where evidence is the personal property of a third party, the court would be
interfering with that party’s right to use his property as he sees fit. 279 New torts for
negligent spoliation, therefore, would be “too expansive and impose an unreasonable
duty on property owners to maintain their personal property.”280 As a result, other
remedies are far more appropriate to combat the negligent destruction of evidence.
However, like with intentional spoliation, supporters argue that traditional
methods used to combat negligent spoliation are inadequate because, in most states,
the adverse inference is not available in cases of negligent spoliation.281 Some states,
however, including Ohio, have extended the possibility of an adverse inference to
cases involving gross negligence.282 But, courts do remain free to use the adverse
274

See Woodell v. Ormet Primary Aluminum Corp., No. 03MO7, 2005 WL 2033285 (Ohio
Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2005); see also Drawl v. Cornicelli, 706 N.E.2d 849 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
275

Levine, supra note 5, at 436 (quoting Wilhoit, supra note 197, at 651-52).

276

See Frossard & Gainsberg, supra note 267, at 703-04 (“[A] new tort for negligent
spoliation would be too expansive and impose an unreasonable duty on property owners to
maintain their personal property.”).
277

See supra Part V.B.4.

278

See supra Part V.B.4.

279

See supra Part V.B.4.

280

Frossard & Gainsberg, supra note 267, at 703-04.

281

Levine, supra note 5, at 428-29.

282

See Roetenberger v. Christ Hosp., 839 N.E.2d 441, 447-48 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005)
(leaving open possibility of adverse inference being used in cases of gross negligence).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014

31

532

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:501

inference as a way to compensate victims of spoliation, rather than as a “punishment
device.”283 By looking more to the importance of the missing evidence, as opposed
to the intent of the party, the adverse inference could be expanded to include cases of
negligent spoliation.284 Thus, the adverse inference can still be an effective tool in
combatting negligent spoliation if courts choose to extend its use to certain instances
of negligence.285
Unlike third party intentional spoliation, however, it does not necessarily follow
that a third party in a negligent spoliation claim will have some stake in the
underlying suit. Although there is little motivation to intentionally destroy evidence
if a party has no stake in the underlying suit,286 a party could have absolutely no
stake in the litigation and accidentally spoliate evidence. This, however, is also
highly unlikely because the third party must have undertaken some duty to preserve
the evidence. Furthermore, even if Ohio were to decide that an additional remedy for
third-party negligent spoliation is necessary, there is no reason to create an entirely
separate cause of action. Instead, several courts have found that “a simple negligence
claim is fully capable of covering instances of negligent spoliation” and “that a
negligent spoliation claim is essentially a disguised negligence claim .”287 Thus,
there is simply no need for Ohio to recognize either first or third party negligent
spoliation as independent torts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In light of the discussion above, Ohio should not recognize independent torts for
spoliation because the torts are inherently speculative, their derivative nature
prolongs litigation and invites frivolous claims, and traditional sanctions and
criminal statutes are adequate to remedy and deter spoliation. Even with the many
problems, however, a small number of proponents continue to justify the torts under
the rationale that for every wrong there should be a remedy. Although an admirable
goal, the problems that come along with the spoliation torts make their recognition
imprudent.
The torts are inherently speculative because, by their very nature, it is impossible
for juries to determine exactly what the destroyed or altered evidence would have
shown or how it would have effected a party’s case. Thus, at the very least, the jury
is forced to take an educated guess as to what the evidence would have shown and
how the underlying case would have been effected by that evidence. As a result,
traditional remedies, such as the adverse inference, more accurately compensate
victims of spoliation and decrease the likelihood of erroneous decisions and
wrongful recoveries.
Moreover, because the tort is a derivative tort, it unnecessarily prolongs litigation
and invites spurious claims. Frequently in litigation, evidence is lost or destroyed
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regardless of the level of care used by the parties. Thus, the torts invite disappointed
litigants, in almost any case, to bring frivolous claims that the evidence was
destroyed intentionally when, in reality, it was destroyed inadvertently. Although
meritorious spoliation claims are possible, any good provided by the tort is vastly
outweighed by the economic burden it places on the courts by encouraging frivolous
claims and prolonging underlying litigation.
This burden is also unnecessary considering the adequacy of various sanctions
designed to combat spoliation and the fact that these sanctions can be narrowly
tailored to the specific circumstances of each case.
Additionally, courts remain free to expand these traditional methods and state
legislatures are free to create entirely new sanctions. Ohio should, therefore, join the
vast majority of states in declining to recognize derivative spoliation torts in all of
their forms.
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